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Abstract: This paper provides what we believe to be the first collection of data on social
capital in the transition countries of Central/Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet
Union. Using data from the World Values Survey 1990 and 1995 we document the de-
gree of trust and of civic participation and find that these indicators of social capital are
significantly lower than in OECD countries. The paper also provides a preliminary in-
vestigation of the link between social capital and growth during transition. Unlike in
market economies, in transition countries trust is not positively related to growth; while
participation in civic organisations shows a positive correlation. We also construct in-
dicators of trust in public institutions and find positive correlations with growth rates.
The positive association of civic participation with growth is robust to the use of in-
strumental variable techniques to control for potential problems of endogeneity.
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Introduction
Social capital has received increasing attention as a crucial variable influencing economic
performance. [Knack and Keefer 1997; Dasgupta and Serageldin 1999]. Particularly, the
widely divergent and often disappointing results in the transition from a centrally planned
to a market economy have been explained by variations in the stock of social capital.
[Nowotny 1998, Stiglitz 1999]. Such efforts, however, have so far failed to take into ac-
count the differences in the definitions and concepts of social capital as they have emerged
in the sociological and political literature [Tardos 1998]. Moreover, for the transition
economies at least, the weight ascribed to social capital in explaining the variations in eco-
nomic performance stands in stark contrast to the dearth of empirical evidence that would
support such conclusions. 
This paper aims to make a first step towards correcting these deficiencies. We start
with a brief view on the salient concepts that have become associated with the term ‘so-
cial capital’. We argue that only one class of definitions used in this literature – namely de-
finitions of what we term ‘formal social capital’ – will lead to non ambiguous propos-
als concerning the impact of social capital on the economic performance of a specific
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country. We then present some first and preliminary evidence on the relationship between
‘formal social capital’ and economic reform and economic growth. We find that, general-
ly, the stock of social capital is low in the transition countries. The relationship between
this level of social capital and economic performance is not clear, however. We find that
extended trust – that is trust in persons other than relatives and close friends – is not re-
lated to growth. This distinguishes the transition countries from countries with a fully
evolved market economy where this correlation does exist. Active participation in various
civic groups, on the other hand, does correlate positively with growth; as does trust in pub-
lic institutions. 
Social capital may be created more easily in prosperous economies: it is therefore
not clear what is the cause and what the effect in the link between social capital and
growth. Indeed, what we find is that more rapid economic growth and higher participation
in civic organisations seem to be joint results of good progress in economic and political
reform and transformation. Both growth and civic participation are also heavily dependent
upon favourable or unfavourable initial conditions. We can, however, identify some initial
conditions that seem to be closely correlated with civic participation but do not seem to
correlate with growth. Using these initial conditions as instruments in a regression of
growth against civic participation allows us to confirm the result of the simple correlation.
The positive contribution of civic participation and trust in public institutions to growth is
then jointly tested and supported in a regression framework, which also controls for the
level of economic reform. 
1. Definitions of social capital 
The theories on social capital may be broadly divided into two sub groups. Following
Putnam [1993], social capital is defined as a cultural phenomenon, denoting the extent of
civic mindedness of members of a society, the existence of social norms promoting col-
lective action and the degree of trust in public institutions. According to Putnam social
capital has the properties of a public good. His work on Italy further suggests that social
capital is accumulated over long periods of history. According to Platteau [1994], the
emergence of universalist morality in western philosophical thinking accompanies the ac-
cumulation of social capital. This permits societies to deal successfully with the problems
of collective action. Similarly, Raiser [1999] argues that ‘extended trust’ is needed in the
transition countries in order to permit the evolution of a modern and market-based divi-
sion of labour. Political scientists in turn focus on the connection between social capital
and the development of those political institutions that establish and uphold the rule of
law and which thus greatly facilitate economic exchange. The empirical evidence we pre-
sent below allows us to test – to some extent at least – the relationships between moral
norms, collective action and trust in public institutions for the transition countries.
In contrast to the definition by Putnam, social capital in the definition of Pierre
Bourdieu [1993] refers to the investment in social networks by individuals. Social capital
here is a private good, which can be converted into cultural capital, real wealth or ‘sym-
bolic capital’ that signals social status. An individual’s stock of social capital is thus a crit-
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ical component of his or her power in society. Coleman [1988], who seems to have intro-
duced the notion of social capital, similarly emphasises the benefits of social capital to the
individual or to a network of individuals. For Coleman, social capital consists of the sum
of the ‘relational capital’ several individuals hold and is governed by norms of reciprocity
which are enforced by peer pressure, gain or loss in reputation, and the like. However, so-
cial capital may have positive economic externalities at the local level, by facilitating col-
lective action.1 Coleman’s definition thus lies somewhere between a public and a private
good. For reasons explained below, it is convenient to group Bourdieu’s and Coleman’s de-
finitions of social capital together, as both are based on the notion of reciprocity in social
and economic relationships rather than universalistic moral norms and values. 
In both these interpretations, social capital facilitates economic exchange. However,
the mechanisms through which this is achieved differ fundamentally. In Putnam’s model
of a working democracy, there is positive feedback between individuals’ sense of civic du-
ty, their participation in social life and the efficiency of existing institutional arrangements
for contract enforcement. Moral obligations are reinforced in social networks and cheat-
ing is expensive. Moreover, civic participation enhances formal rule compliance and im-
proves the accountability of government. Social capital therefore is complementary to for-
mal institutions in supporting a complex division of labour. We label this type of social
capital ‘formal’. The choice of terminology reflects the fact that this social capital is ac-
cessible to all, independently of personal characteristics, rather like a formal institution
such as a legal right or liberty. Its effect on economic performance at the country level
should be unambiguously positive.
In Bourdieu’s and Coleman’s view, social capital may facilitate economic transac-
tions between individuals, but this may often happen at the expense of excluding others.
Belonging to a business club, for example, might yield solid pay – offs for those with suf-
ficient wealth and social standing to be accepted as members. But the same business clubs
might play the role of a protective guild vis a vis potential new entrants. Similarly, it is not
clear whether a high degree of social capital at the local level translates necessarily into a
benefit for the wider society. 
The real test for all dense social networks is how they adapt to new economic cir-
cumstances that would require transactions with non-members (for case studies of effi-
cient and non-efficient adaptation see [Humphrey and Schmitz 1996]; see also [Sedaitis
1997] for the case of Russia). Based on the relational and reciprocal aspect of most trans-
actions conducted within these types of network, we label the Bourdieu/Coleman variety
of social capital ‘informal’. As explained, the effect of informal social capital on a coun-
try’s overall economic performance is uncertain and could be negative. 
Formal and informal social capital may co-exist, but they do not necessarily com-
plement each other. When formal institutions are weak, informal social capital may have
particular importance [Fukuyama 1995]. Over time, social relations may become increas-
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1 It is intriguing to think of social capital as an asset that is accumulated the more it is used. Hence,
where norms of reciprocity exist, the more I offer help to my neighbour, the more he or she will feel
obliged to help me.
ingly formalised and dense local networks might co-exist with a high level of civic partici-
pation and well-developed formal institutions. However, reliance on informal social capi-
tal (‘connections’), particularly in relationships with public officials could also undermine
trust in the impartiality of formal public institutions and corrode their functions through
corruption, clientilism and ‘tunnelling’ out of public resources for private ends. Unfortu-
nately, the data at our disposition does not provide for very clear-cut distinctions between
formal and informal social capital. But it allows us to test whether in the transition coun-
tries the two types of social capital are closely related to one another, or whether the pres-
ence of one type of social capital implies that there is less of the other type.2
2. The role of social capital in transitional societies
The transition from central planning to a market economy and the transition from an au-
thoritarian to a democratic regime is fundamentally a process of accelerated institutional
change. Both formal and informal institutions need to adapt to the requirements of democ-
racy and of market transactions. The resulting uncertainty places a heavy load on social
arrangements. Mechanisms are thus needed to stabilise mutual expectations and to make
behaviour of actual or potential counterparts more predictable [Wallace 1999].
There is large scope in transition for co-ordination of economic exchange through
informal institutions and networks. These include barter arrangements, transactions in the
grey and black economy and enterprise networks. All of these are based on ‘informal so-
cial capital’ [Kolankiewicz 1996; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1997]. Many empirical stud-
ies have highlighted the relevance of such informal social capital in the transition process;
as for instance the extent to which relationships between enterprise directors and bureau-
crats as they existed under communism have been adapted to take advantage of new eco-
nomic opportunities [Stark 1997; Hayri and McDermott 1998]. Yet, the use of such in-
formal networks can imply high overall costs to the general public. Entry of potential com-
petitors may be discouraged. State institutions may be ‘captured’ and subverted to serve
not the public interest but private gain [Hellman et al. 2000a]. In transition countries, the
single individual might thus garner high returns from his informal social capital [Aslund
1996]. In absence of effective and countervailing public institutions, the social return on
this capital could, however, become negative.
Both leading Eastern European dissidents (e.g. Vaclav Havel or Gyorgy Konrad)
and Western social scientists have lamented the absence of a fully developed, vibrant civ-
il society in communist and post-communist countries. This deficit would pose a major ob-
stacle on the path of political and economic transition [see Smolar 1996; Rose 1993]. All
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2 The question of complementarity between formal and informal social capital has a parallel in the
discussion of whether relational contract enforcement and formal, written contracts are
complements or substitutes. Some recent evidence for market economies suggest that important
complementarities exist between the two (Poppo and Zenger, 2000) although on aggregate the use
of relational contracting is arguably more pervasive in less developed countries.
communist countries had experienced a phase of stark, totalitarian rule; and even after se-
vere repression ended with the Stalinist era, participation in public affairs remained forced
and ritualistic. People therefore tended to retreat from the public sphere into privacy; into
the realm of relatives and immediate friends; or into innocuous groups promoting non-con-
troversial cultural and leisure activities. Public institutions were perceived as alien, and –
in central Europe in particular – as imposed by a foreign power. 
Distrust in public institutions is thus one of the most pernicious legacies of commu-
nism [Gati 1996]. Surveys that compare corruption and the rule of law in the various
countries of the globe generally place the transition economies well below the advanced
market economies, and in the case of the CIS member states even below developing coun-
tries with similar income levels [see Surcke 2000, Transparency International 2000]. In
short, communism seems to have left as legacy the perception that while each individual
might profit from informal social capital, private returns to civic participation and other
forms of  ‘formal social capital’ would be low. Despite potentially very high returns to civic
mindedness and cooperation during the transition, it would not be easily established – thus
providing one possible reason for the disappointing economic performance of many tran-
sition economies. 
In the remainder of this paper, we investigate three sets of questions. First, how do
the transition economies compare with market economies as regards the nature and the
stock of social capital? Second, what is the relationship between the stock and type of for-
mal social capital and economic performance? Third, is the level of formal social capital
in each country positively or negatively associated with the level of informal social capi-
tal? 
3. Social capital in transition – preliminary evidence
In the empirical work that follows, we benefit from the availability of data from the 1990
and 1995 World Values Survey [WVS], which included 12 and 21 transition economies re-
spectively to construct measures of moral attitudes, trust and civic participation. In this
we follow Knack and Keefer [1997], who use a measure of ‘trust’ among anonymous in-
dividuals and the degree of participation in civic organisations as their measures of formal
social capital. As measures of informal social capital we take the importance people attach
to family and friends, also from the WVS. We then compare the data in the WVS with sur-
vey results from the New Democracy Barometer – NDB [see Rose 1998 and Rose, Mishler
and Haerpfer 1997] and from EBRD’s Business Environment Survey-WBES [see Hellman
et al. 2000b]. Table 1 summarises all indicators used, gives their definitions, and shows
which concept of social capital – formal or informal – they should be attributed to.
Before going any further an important caveat on the information conveyed by dif-
ferent country survey data should be noted. The responses given to questions that measure
trust may be influenced in important ways by cyclical swings in public morale, or by spe-
cific events in any one year. Since the resulting variations over time are unlikely to coin-
cide across countries, substantial biases could result from comparing countries at one
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point in time. Equally important is the bias given to answers on issues of belief (such as
trust and civic mindedness) by varying cultural traditions, or by the absence of a routine
of opinion surveys. Such differences inevitably flavour the responses given and sometimes
in ways that contradict the common perception of outsiders. Hungarians for instance, hold
both their present political and their present economic regime in low esteem. Citizens in
transition countries, worse off politically and economically, seem to have much higher es-
teem for their own institutions [see Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1997]. Notwithstanding
such shortcomings, opinion surveys have provided a valuable tool for comparative cross-
country analysis. 
3.1 The hour-glass society – trust among anonymous individuals
The vast World Values Survey aims to uncover differences in the social and political atti-
tudes as they exist between the populations of the countries covered. The key question on
trust is as follows: ‘Would you agree that people can generally be trusted or would you say
that you cannot be too careful about other people?’ Table 2 shows the average scores for
the trust variable for all 21 transition countries in 1995 and in 1990, as well as the average
for the OECD countries, for China and for Turkey. The latter two are the only developing
countries that were made available to us from the data set, with China being of particular
interest, as it is also a transition country. 
The main finding is that in transition countries trust is generally lower than in the
average OECD country; and much lower than in China; but much higher than in Turkey.
Moreover, there is no indication at all from the data that in the transition countries, trust
is correlated with economic performance. For instance, in 1995 the highest score for trust
was achieved in the economically despondent Ukraine, whereas the second lowest score
was registered for Poland, which, at that time, had already experienced two years of solid
economic growth. A high level of trust might, however, have played a role in explaining the
superior economic performance of China during its transition.3
Note that the results are generally robust over time, as the results for the 1990 sur-
vey available for 12 transition economies show. There is a general tendency for trust to de-
cline between the two rounds in both market and transition economies. Changes in trust
between rounds have very little to do with performance during the transition either – both
stagnating Russia and booming Poland see their score decline by 13.9 and 16.6 percentage
points respectively; which is rather similar to the declines in trust observed in the USA and
the UK. 
We further check the consistency of this important result by looking at various oth-
er measures of moral attitudes or civic mindedness reported in the WVS. Respondents
were asked to record the frequency with which they engaged activities that implied a dis-
regard for the common good. Again, it seems that compared with citizens in the advanced
and wealthy countries, citizens in the transition countries are significantly less ‘civic-mind-
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2002, Vol. 38, No. 6
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3 Note that Fukuyama classifies China as a ‘low trust’ economy and puts much stronger emphasis
on informal social capital (the extended family) in explaining its recent success.
ed’ (see also [Ockenfels and Weimann 1996]; but for a qualifying view see [Bolle 1999]).
However, when asked about their attitudes towards the needs of others, citizens in the tran-
sition countries do not seem to differ that much from citizens in OECD countries. Their
level of professed altruism is roughly comparable to the level of altruism in the OECD
countries. On all of these counts, China shows higher scores than the transition countries
to its West. 
As has been mentioned, international, cross-country surveys on attitudes and opin-
ions are plagued with numerous difficulties of interpretation. The results presented here
should therefore be accepted with quite some caution. One major conclusion imposes it-
self nonetheless: extended trust in the sense of trust among anonymous individuals cannot
be a major factor explaining the variations of economic performance among the transition
countries of Central/Eastern Europe and of the FSU. The evidence rather indicates that
trust is generally low in the transition economies. Rose [1995] summarises the arguments
why this may be so in the picture of an ‘hour-glass society’. Under communism, individu-
als forged strong mutual ties at the level of family and close friends, but rarely did they ven-
ture out of this well-defined circle. This part of the population formed the bottom of the
hour-glass. At the top of the hour-glass were the similarly closed circles composed of the
privileged, powerful and few members of the ‘nomenclatura’. There was little interaction
between these two levels. 
Table 3 proceeds to check this particular argument. It reports the degree of impor-
tance individuals attach to families on one hand, and friends on the other. These are the
only two indicators of informal social capital that become available through the WVS.
People in transition countries value families as highly as do people in wealthy countries
with fully developed market economies (albeit with some notable variation across coun-
tries). However, people in transition countries seem to rely far less on friends than people
in OECD countries. Moreover, in such wealthy countries reliance on friends is highly cor-
related with the level of trust towards outsiders. This correlation does not exist in transi-
tion countries. Social circles in transition economies would seem to be smaller and more
closed than in market economies, where the positive association between informal social
capital (such as networks among friends) and general moral attitudes (extended trust) is
higher.
3.2 Widening the hour glass – civic participation in transition
The World Value Survey also includes questions on the participation of individuals in civ-
il society and on their confidence in public institutions. Participation in civil society is
measured by active membership in civic organisations, including the Church, sports clubs,
arts associations, environmental associations, and charities. In addition, there are also
questions on membership in groups that represent economic or political interests such as
trade unions, political parties and professional associations. The variable used in this
analysis is the share of respondents saying that they are actively involved in such organi-
sations.
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Just as in the case of extended trust, participation in civic organisations is signifi-
cantly lower in the transition countries than it is in countries with fully developed market
economies – at least in most cases. The difference are more pronounced in 1995 than in
1990, however. In 1995, only the level of participation in political parties is comparable to
the level of participation as it exists in established democracies and market economies.
Unlike in the case of extended trust, there now is a significant correlation between partic-
ipation rates in some of these civic organisations and economic growth during the transi-
tion. Cumulative growth between 1989 and 1998 correlates positively with participation in
professional associations, in sports clubs, as well as with participation in ‘other not further
defined organisations’ (we ignore this category in our further analysis). 
We now divide the organisations listed in Table 4 into three groups: 
1) Organisations that relate more to the private sphere, to personal beliefs, to personal
morality and to the realm of leisure. This group includes the Church, sports clubs, arts
organisations and environmental organisations, and charities. For the purposes of this
paper we will call this group ‘Type One’ organisations. 
2) Organisations which pertain more closely to the political and economic realm. The
group includes political parties, trade unions, and professional groupings. For the pur-
poses of this paper, we call this group ‘Type Two’ organisations.
3) For further analysis, we also form a subgroup of the ‘Type One’ organisations, exclud-
ing environmental and arts groups, which may be of least relevance for the formation
of business ties and thus for economic performance.
This sub-division mirrors the sub-division into ‘Putnam’ and ‘Olson’ groups estab-
lished in Knack and Keefer [1997]. 4 ‘Type One’ groups relate directly to the idea of a vi-
brant civil society and thus are assumed to impact positively on growth. Expectations with
regard to the economic impact of the ‘Type Two’ groups diverge. They could affect eco-
nomic growth negatively, especially if they become associated with rent-seeking by vested
interests. But, on the other hand, they are an essential element of a pluralistic society
and polity. As a matter of fact, Knack and Keefer find that in mature market economies,
participation in the ‘Type Two’ groups has the stronger and more significant impact on
growth. This suggests that at least in mature market economies, the benefits of function-
ing political institutions that can resolve social conflicts overweighs the disadvantages of
organised vested interests seeking rents and blocking decision making. 
All three sub-groups display a positive correlation with cumulative growth over the
1989–1998 period in the transition economies. These correlations are significant at the 5%
level. Because of its stronger correlation with economic performance, we henceforth focus
on the sub-group of ‘Type One’ organisations (excluding arts clubs and environmental as-
sociations) in all subsequent analysis. Correlations do not establish causality, of course. To
take into account the possibility that economic growth may influence civic engagement,
we repeated the exercise using civic participation in 1990. For that year, the sample of tran-
sition economies is much smaller, and the correlations of civic participation to subsequent
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2002, Vol. 38, No. 6
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4 Knack and Keefer ( 1997) use the term ‘Putnam Group’ for the first type of organisations; and the
term ‘Olson Group’ for what we describe as ‘Type Two’ organisations.
growth are insignificant. Thus intense civic participation at the start of transition does not
seem to have contributed to subsequent growth. Chart 1 shows the changes in ‘Type One’
and ‘Type Two’ group participation for the 8 countries for which data is available in both
survey years. Slovenia, Hungary and Romania show an increase in civic participation in all
three groups, Russia only in the ‘Type Two’ groups, and the other four countries show de-
clines in civic participation between 1990 and 1995. 
Does this evidence suggest that growth determines the extent of civic participation
rather than vice versa? Not necessarily. The nature of civil organisations is unlikely to be
constant during the transition. At the start of transition, most organisations could have
still been coloured and impregnated by the communist legacy; while by 1995, most of such
organsisation would have established an autonomous identity. More or less forced mem-
bership would have become supplanted by voluntary membership. We could also interpret
our data as implying that an active civil society is an endogenous outcome of a successful
transition, which in turn feeds back into higher growth rates. Indeed, in the next section,
we find that high civic participation is a feature of countries with generally more
favourable initial conditions and thus better overall performance during the transition.
We also ask, whether and how civic participation is correlated with political atti-
tudes and with the volume of informal social capital. Indeed, citizens in transition coun-
tries are not less interested in politics than are citizens of countries with developed market
economies. But unlike in the countries with market economies, in the transition countries
political interest does not correlate with political participation in a cross-country compar-
ison. As noted further above, people in transition countries attach less importance to
friends than do people in fully consolidated democracies and market economies (although
more than people in China!). Moreover, strong reliance on friends does not lead to high-
er civic participation – again in contrast to market economies.
The results obtained so far show a curious disjuncture in transition economies be-
tween the cross-country pattern for civic participation and the variation of social and
moral attitudes of individuals. In some ways, one might be tempted to conclude that ac-
tions speak louder than words and that the civic participation variables are simply a more
reliable representation of individual attitudes and ultimately of the level of social capital
than questions about trust, reliance on the family, or interest in politics. Another inter-
pretation, however, would be that these results show the path dependence of attitudes to-
wards everything beyond the intimate circle of relatives and close friends. These attitudes
change but at a sluggish pace. Civic organisations, on the other hand, have to adapt rapid-
ly to a changing economic and political environment. Individual attitudes and habits that
define the relation to these organisations change much more slowly. This interpretation is
confirmed by other experiences of transition towards democracy. In post totalitarian
Germany [Conradt 1980] and Austria, or in post authoritarian Portugal, democratic in-
stitutions became established and consolidated quite quickly, whereas it took much longer
– a generation at least – for the corresponding democratic attitudes to become universal-
ly shared. 
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3.3 Trust in state institutions
We now turn our attention to attitudes towards the state, or trust in public institutions.
While a key aspect of a functioning market economy and democracy, this might be con-
ceived not so much as a prerequisite for the accumulation of social capital; but as its con-
sequence. The WVS asks respondents to rate their degree of confidence in a number of in-
stitutions, including government, the press, the army, the legal system, the civil service,
trade unions, the enterprise sector, the church and others. Scores range from 1–4, with 4
representing a lot of confidence and 1 no confidence. 
Table 5 reports average scores for confidence in various institutions and again com-
pares the answer to those given in countries with fully developed market economies. The
results show that in transition countries, trust in public institutions is not systematically
lower than in the wealthier Western countries. But there are notable exceptions concern-
ing some key institutions: the legal system, the police, the trade unions, commercial com-
panies and political parties. The results are roughly similar for 1990 and for 1995. The five
first years of transition have not improved confidence in these essential institutions. 
While, on the face of this evidence, the much-lamented lack of trust in institutions
seems to be specific to a few – albeit important – areas, further robustness checks on the
data raise concern about the results of the WVS. We compared the responses from NDB
and BEEPS (implemented jointly by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and the World Bank in 1999 – see [Hellman et al. 2000b]) with those given in the WVS.
Both the NBD and the BEEPS include alternative ratings of trust in institutions by house-
holds and enterprises respectively. The NDB asks respondents to rate their trust in a giv-
en institution on a scale of 1–7 (with higher scores reflecting more trust). The BEEPS asks
enterprises to rate the performance of various state institutions on a scale of 1 to 5. 
Table 5 reports the correlations between the WVS and NDB and BEEPS trust scores
for all those institutions where comparable questions were asked. Several correlations are
negative, which raises suspicions about the usefulness of the data. The strongest positive
correlations can be established for the following institutions: i) political parties, ii) the po-
lice, iii) the army, iv) the Church, and v) the legal system. As it happens, with the excep-
tion of the Church and the army, these are also among the institutions where transition
economies record significantly lower levels of trust than OECD countries. We henceforth
focus only on trust in the legal system, the police, the army, political parties and the
Church as potential determinants of performance during the transition. 
In the bottom of Table 5, we present correlations of confidence in the five institu-
tions highlighted above with cumulative growth in 1989–1998. Confidence in the police
shows the strongest positive correlation with growth, while confidence in the Church is
weakly negatively related to cumulative growth during 1989–1998. The other correlations
remain statistically insignificant. Table 5 also presents the correlation of an aggregate ‘con-
fidence in the rule of law index’ with growth. This index is constructed as the sum of con-
fidence in the police, the legal system and the army. It is weakly correlated with growth
during the 1989–1998 period. 
This result is somewhat disappointing given the importance generally attributed to
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trust in public institutions. Indeed, when using the data from the NDB or the WBES, we
get much stronger correlations. In Figure 2, we present a correlation of the average NDB
score for trust in seven public institutions (the army, the civil servants, the courts, the gov-
ernment, the parliament, the political parties, and the police) against annual growth,
pooled over the 4 years in which the NDB was implemented – 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1998.
The correlation is positive and highly significant. The correlations with each of the sub-
components are also highly significant. In Figure 3, we correlate cumulative growth in
1989–1998 against the degree of confidence in the legal system obtained from the BEEPS
– again with highly significant results. Thus, while the WVS data do not yield strong con-
clusions about the relevance of trust in public institutions for a successful economic tran-
sition, data from other sources suggest that trust in public institutions is important. 
3.4 Civic participation and trust in institutions – making social capital work
The evidence found on the positive relationship between civic participation and growth
and between trust in public institutions and growth might suggest that civic participation
and trust in institutions are themselves highly correlated. Indeed, at the heart of Putnam’s
argument about the role of civil society and of social capital for economic performance
lies an argument about the impact that civil society has on the quality of government (thus
the title of his famous book: Making Democracy Work). 
Table 6 presents correlation coefficients between the two groups of civic organisa-
tions and trust in various public institutions. The strongest positive correlation can be es-
tablished between civic participation and trust in the police. Trust in the legal system and
the army is also positively related to civic participation. The correlation between civic par-
ticipation and trust in these three institutions is slightly higher for ‘Type Two’ groups than
for ‘Type One’ groups. There thus seems to be some association between civic engagement
and trust in public institutions, particularly those associated with the rule of law. But the
results are too weak to draw strong conclusions.
Data from the BEEPS again show only a weak positive correlation between civic par-
ticipation and confidence in the legal system. However, taking trust in public institutions
in the NDB as our measure of trust in the state, we find a strong positive correlation with
civic participation both for ‘Type One’ and ‘Type Two’ groups. The small sample of just
12 transition economies cautions about reading too much into these results, but they do
suggest that Putnam’s argument of how democracy works might find some support in the
transition economies. Note that a consistency check for market economies confirms that
trust in state institutions in positively associated with civic engagement in both ‘Type One’
and ‘Type Two’ groups. 
4. Social capital, initial conditions and economic reforms
What factors might explain the variation in social capital among the transition countries?
And are these factors also important in explaining differences in economic performance
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across countries? An answer to these two questions is an important step in identifying the
causal links behind the correlations established so far. They might shed some light on pos-
sible policies that might raise trust. 
4.1 Initial conditions and social capital
The existing literature provides some limited guidance on the possible determinants of the
level of social capital in transition. Alesina and La Ferrara [2000] investigate the variation
in trust among residents of the US. They find that social inequalities and ethnic hetero-
geneity at the local level are important determinants of trust. This is in line with the rea-
soning in Knack and Zak [1998] who present a model and some cross-country evidence
linking trust to social distance – measured in this case by income inequality. Income in-
equality at the start of transition did show some variation across countries [Atkinson and
Micklewright 1992], and ethnic divisions were very important in some countries but not
in others. As Table 7 shows, initial income inequality is not related to civic participation
five years later in 1995. By the mid-1990s, however, income inequality had started to di-
verge dramatically across the region and was negatively (albeit only weakly) correlated
with the level of civic participation. 
Since moral traditions and other aspects of culture are path dependent by their very
nature, variations in civic participation could reflect underlying variations in historical de-
velopments [Putnam 1993; Platteau 1994]. It is not evident which aspects of different his-
torical developments should be highlighted in this respect. We focus here on religious af-
filiation, GDP per capita and the rate of urbanisation. The first is a proxy for cultural dif-
ferences, the second two variables measure differences in economic development. The cor-
relations in Table 7 show that civic participation in ‘Type One’ groups and the overall in-
vestment climate rating is higher in places where the main religious affiliation is with ei-
ther Protestantism or Catholicism. The level of urbanisation is negatively associated with
civic participation – a finding that might support the notion of anonymity and isolation in
urban agglomerations. Initial GDP per capita is not strongly correlated with either civic
participation or trust in institutions.
Variations in the size of adjustment cost following years of distortive policies under
central planning might also influence the level and quality social capital in the process of
economic and political transition. Where such costs are very high, people may remain tied
to subsistence strategies and might tend to be politically passive rather than actively par-
ticipating in the process of change. This in turn would tend to reduce the opportunity for
gaining trust in others as well as gaining trust in public institutions. We propose to capture
the extent of adjustment costs during transition here with the simple geographic distance
to Brussels, the numbers of years spent under central planning, the share of exports to the
CMEA normalised by GDP, a dummy for whether a country had a prior history as a na-
tion state and a dummy for the endowment with natural resources. As Table 7 reveals,
higher economic distortions tend to be strongly correlated with lower civic participation
rates, as does abundance with natural resources. Economic distortions are, however, by
and large not associated with higher or lower trust in public institutions.
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Looking at the final column in Table 7 it becomes apparent that most of the initial
conditions listed here are also significantly associated with growth performance across the
transition economies. This finding confirms the view, expressed further above, that varia-
tions in economic performance and the creation of social capital are really joint products
of the same underlying causes. But this fact poses a methodological problem because it
does not allow us to use the correlations between initial conditions and social capital to
get around the issue of causality in the relationship between social capital and growth.5
Luckily, two of the variables seem to be highly correlated with civic participation but
not with growth rates. These are exports to the CMEA and the urbanisation rate. At least
for civic participation rates, these variables would seem to provide reasonably good in-
struments. For trust in public institutions no valid instruments are available. We now ver-
ify the results obtained so far in a regression framework, explicitly testing to what extent
endogeneity of the social capital variables biases our results, using exports to the CMEA
and the urbanisation rate as instruments for civic participation. 
4.2 Civic participation, trust in public institutions and reform – preliminary regression
results
So far we have presented just simple correlations. But these leave open the question as to
whether the various measures of social capital are jointly significant and what weight to at-
tribute to civic participation and trust in public institutions respectively. We will now use
some very simple and preliminary regression to analyse this issue. We also conduct a very
basic robustness test by including economic reforms into the model. Many other potential
determinants of growth in transition are not included, raising the possibility of spurious re-
sults due to model misspecification. To some extent we would argue that such problems
are unavoidable when investigating transition outcomes. But the very small number of ob-
servations obliges us to limit the number of variables. 
We examine a very simple model of the form:
Growth = a + b*Civic engagement + c*Trust in institutions + d*Reforms + e
We also examine some interaction effects between all three variables. Trust in insti-
tutions is measured by the BEEPS investment climate scores. Reforms are measured as the
average over the 1989–1998 period using EBRD’s transition indicators. Growth is given as
the logarithmic difference in income levels in between 1998 and 1989.
Table 8 presents the results of our various specifications. At the bottom of each col-
umn are two test-statistics, which examine whether endogeneity bias is a problem for our re-
sults. The Sargan-test for valid instruments essentially tests whether the instruments used al-
so belong in the regression equation. As we established in the previous section, exports to
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5 In other words, the initial conditions variables really belong in the growth equation. They would
thus be correlated with the residuals of a simple regression of growth against social capital and thus
not be valid instruments. 
the CMEA and the urbanisation rate would seem to qualify as valid instruments due to the
low correlation with growth but high correlation with civic participation. The Sargan test sta-
tistic fails to reject the validity of these two instruments in all the regressions. Note that for
trust in institutions no instruments could be found and results thus need to be read with cau-
tion. The Hausman test checks the assumption of exogeneity directly by comparing the OLS
and the IV estimators. Again in all the regressions shown, we fail to reject OLS estimation.6
The results in columns 1 and 2 confirm the simple correlations presented above. Over
the 1989–1998 period, civic engagement is positively associated with economic growth. The
value of the coefficient for ‘Type One’ groups is considerably lower than for ‘Type Two’
groups. Yet, the cross-country variance in the latter is also smaller – the value of the coef-
ficients in both cases imply that one standard deviation in civic participation would explain
around a 20 percentage point difference in cumulative growth. Moreover, the results sug-
gest that although civic engagement may increase trust in formal institutions, it seems to
have an independent positive effect on growth. One way through which civic engagement
might directly benefit economic performance is by facilitating self-enforcement of market
rules, without the need for recourse to third party enforcement by formal institutions. 
Columns 3–4 show results of interacting civic engagement with trust in formal in-
stitutions. As mentioned, complementarity between these two variables is implied in
Putnam’s [1993] view of social capital. If his theory is correct, this also would imply a pos-
itive coefficient on the interaction term. Multicollinearity clouds the results in the case of
‘Type One’ groups, although the sign of the coefficient on the interactive term is positive.
For ‘Type Two’ groups, we find no evidence of complementarity – in fact the interactive
term is significantly negative.
In columns 5–6 of Table 8, we add economic reforms to the set of regressors.
Economic reforms are positively correlated with each of these three variables, causing sig-
nificance levels to drop relative to columns 1–4, although the total fit of the regressions im-
proves considerably. Note, however, that for ‘Type Two’ groups the coefficient remains sig-
nificant (column 6) and is only moderately reduced in value from the result in column 2. 
One way to correct for problems of collinearity is to adopt a two-step procedure, first
regressing reforms against civic participation and trust in public institutions and then us-
ing the residuals from this regression as a proxy for reforms in the performance equation.
The result for ‘Type One’ groups appears in columns 7. Once the correction is used, the
positive impact of social capital reappears, while reforms maintain a positive impact on
growth. Finally, we attempted to find evidence for a positive interaction between reforms
and the level of social capital but did not find convincing evidence that reforms work more
effectively where civil participation or trust in the government are high. 
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6 Following Greene (2000, p. 385) we chose a simple F-test implementation of the Hausman test,
which involves first regressing the potentially endogenous variable against the set of instruments and
using the obatined fitted value as an additional regressor in the original equation. The F-test rejects
the OLS specification if the fitted value is significantly different than zero. Support for the OLS
model also comes from a comparison of coefficients in the two specifications: the coefficients on
civic participation do not change much between the OLS and IV models.
5. Conclusion and policy implications
To recapitulate, this paper has yielded the following results. First, we established that – un-
like in countries with mature market economies – differences in trust among anonymous
individuals are not a good explanation for variation in economic performance of the tran-
sition countries. This, however, does not exclude the possibility that the low level of trust
observed in all of these countries would impair the prospects for their long term econom-
ic growth and would disadvantage them in this respect in comparison to other emerging
markets. 
Second, the evidence shows that civic participation does seem to be correlated with
economic growth, although the two are probably joint products of the same underlying
causes. Nonetheless, our results are robust to corrections to account for endogeneity and
to the inclusion of reforms as a determinant of growth. The causal mechanism linking civic
participation to growth would seem to lie in the potential of civic organisations to improve
the effectiveness of markets, for instance by facilitating the transmission of information,
by lowering the costs of monitoring and enforcement, and by giving voice in the political
process to market participants. 
Third, trust in public institutions is also positively correlated with growth. Insti-
tutions that seem to be of particular relevance during the transition are the legal system
and the police, while results for political institutions are more ambiguous. Trust in the me-
dia and in the Church does not seem to be related to economic performance.
Fourth, there is some evidence that trust in public institutions is positively correlat-
ed with civic participation. Our results are thus consistent with Putnam’s theory of how
democracy works. Yet, both civic participation and trust in public institutions have inde-
pendent positive effects on growth. Civic engagement thus benefits economic performance
not just by improving the performance of the state, but also by facilitating bilateral ex-
change. Our results suggest therefore that Putnam and Coleman may both be right.
What implications can be drawn from this analysis for policy? As we have shown,
levels of social capital achieved in the mid-1990s were significantly correlated with vari-
ables characterising the different economic and social starting points in the transition.
Those countries closest geographically and historically to Western Europe seem to have
had the greatest ease in developing a civil society that could support the transition process.
Keeping alive the hope of ‘returning to Europe’ may be one way in which the outside world
could help build trust and social capital in the region – particularly in Southeastern
Europe. In Russia and the CIS, a careful dialogue will be needed in order to help overcome
legacies of distrust.
The negative correlation between income inequality and social capital that had
evolved by the mid-1990s suggests that policies aimed a reducing high levels of income in-
equality could be important in a strategy of increasing trust in others and in public insti-
tutions. By the same token, governments should eschew chauvinistic tendencies within
their countries, which only serve to exacerbate social divisions and thereby undermine
trust. Finally, as Stiglitz [1996] and Dic Lo [1998] argue based on the success of East
Asia, there are ways for governments to build trust in public institutions by offering a dia-
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logue to members of the public and consulting over important policy changes. Low trust
in public institutions is one of the predicaments politics in transition countries are faced
with. But it is a predicament politics can deal with – at least in many important respects.
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Table 1. Formal and informal social capital, data, definitions, and sources
Source Definition Type of social
capital
Generalised trust WVS Percentage of respondents that say they trust Formal
other people (alternative response: can’t be 
too careful about others)
Civic-mindedness WVS Mean score (1 = always, 10 = never) Formal
of frequency of immoral actions (fare dodging, 
tax cheating, buying stolen goods, accepting 
bribes)
Altruism WVS Percentage of respondents who say they think Formal
about others (alternative response: only think 
about oneself)
Civic participation WVS Percentage of respondents who are active Formal
in civic organisations (alternative responses: 
members, but inactive; not members)
Ascribed trust WVS Percentage of respondents who value family Informal
a lot (alternative responses: rather, not at all)
Process-based trust WVS Percentage of respondents who value friends Informal
a lot (alternative responses: rather, not at all)
Political interest WVS Percentage of respondents who frequently Formal
discuss politics (alternative response: politics 
not frequently discussed
Confidence in WVS Mean score (1 = low confidence; 4 = high Formal
formal institutions confidence) for each institution
Trust in institutions NDB Mean score (1 = no trust, 7 = great trust) Formal
for each institution
Confidence in legal BEEPS Mean score (0 = low confidence; 3 = high Formal
system confidence)
Quality of BEEPS Mean score of obstacles to investment 
investment climate (0 = high obstacles; 3 = low obstacles) 
formed over 10 dimensions, including policy 
instability, inflation, exchange rate, finance, 
taxes and regulation, infrastructure, judiciary, 
corruption, street crime, organised crime Formal
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Table 2. Extended trust in transition
1990               1995
Transition economies 26,4 23,2
Albania           27,0
Armenia           24,7
Azerbaijan        20,5
Belarus     25,5 24,1
Bulgaria    30,4 28,6
Croatia           25,1
Czech Republic      30,2 28,5
Estonia     27,6 21,5
Georgia           23,4
Hungary     24,6 22,7
Latvia 19,0 24,7
Lithuania   30,8 21,9
FYR Macedonia         8,2
Moldova           22,2
Poland      34,5 17,9
Romania     16,1 18,7
Russia      37,5 23,9
Serbia+Montenegro 30,2
Slovakia 23,0 27,0
Slovenia    17,4 15,5
Ukraine           31,0
OECD 44,5 43,0
China 60,3 52,3
Turkey      10,0 5,5
T-test: Transition economies vs. OECD* 0,00 0,00
Correlation with growth:
cumulative growth 1989–1998 –0,15 –0,27
Notes: 
* T-test reports P-values for difference in means; 0.00 means
statistically significant at more than 1% level.
Source: World Values Survey 1990, 1995.
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Table 3. Ascribed and process-based trust in transition economies
1995                                      1990
Reliance          Reliance           Reliance            Reliance 
on family        on friends         on family          on friends
a lot    rather   a lot    rather     a lot    rather    a lot    rather
Transition economies 86,04 11,91 35,35 50,17 79,52 17,21 27,35 49,09
Albania           96,28 3,22 19,14 67,59
Armenia           86,30 12,09 44,65 46,56
Azerbaijan        85,13 13,26 35,27 56,73
Belarus           84,48 13,30 31,73 50,75 76,85 19,74 36,52 43,86
Bulgaria          88,53 10,24 41,46 45,54 76,07 20,12 38,43 39,23
Croatia           85,34 12,23 48,41 43,55
Czech Rep.            91,08 7,26 38,65 50,83 85,59 10,97 27,96 52,58
Estonia           78,13 19,61 26,89 59,27 68,54 27,15 22,81 51,10
Georgia           91,19 7,11 67,84 27,87
Hungary           89,52 8,17 38,33 37,87 88,54 8,44 27,48 44,93
Latvia          68,06 25,50 24,29 57,01 72,52 23,26 16,38 52,73
Lithuania         73,97 23,22 21,89 56,02 65,31 28,79 19,01 53,08
FYR Macedonia 97,98 1,82 49,64 42,44
Moldova           79,04 18,11 21,39 50,97
Poland            90,15 9,50 26,11 58,49 90,59 7,91 22,76 56,20
Romania           88,83 8,90 20,76 47,45 83,21 15,23 24,70 49,03
Russia            84,06 12,65 29,35 49,78 78,94 17,68 29,24 47,59
Serbia+Montenegro 88,79 9,76 48,28 45,57
Slovakia 90,95 8,23 32,26 59,17 87,47 9,94 25,27 53,35
Slovenia          82,52 14,59 41,14 46,22 80,63 17,31 37,66 45,37
Ukraine           86,59 11,43 34,99 53,98
OECD 85,99 12,12 56,79 38,69 84,02 13,48 47,02 44,74
China 76,67 22,06 29,91 55,95 62,19 33,00 21,55 51,96
Turkey 97,53 2,05 70,47 27,64 87,17 11,95 55,40 36,61
T-Test: TEs vs. OECD* 0,49 0,46 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,08 0,00 0,05
Correlate with Trust**
TEs –0,08 0,07 –0,01 0,16 –0,03 –0,01 0,00 0,11
OECD 0,16 –0,20 0,43 –0,30 0,53 –0,56 0,79 –0,68
All –0,16 0,17 0,35 –0,22 0,22 –0,25 0,57 –0,41
All1*** 0,01 –0,02 0,60 –0,45 0,45 –0,47 0,81 –0,59
Notes: 
Numbers in columns are percentage shares of respondents who consider family (friends) as very
(rather) important.
*** T-test reports P-value for difference in sub-group means; 0.00 means statistically significant at
more than 1% level.
*** Trust is measured as in Table 2.  All correlations significant at 5% level are shown in bold.
*** All countries without China and Turkey.
Source: World Values Survey 1990, 1995.  

















4 Table 4. Civic participation, 1995
Share of active participants in institutions, %
Church    Sports     Arts   Unions   Parties  Environ- Profes-  Charity   Other          Type I*   Type II**
ment     sional
Transition economies 5,38 5,25 3,75 3,75 2,49 0,90 2,72 1,45 2,06 12,08 9,13
Albania           4,82 5,12 3,32 1,61 13,17 0,81 4,94 0,81 0,40 10,75 19,72
Armenia           1,45 5,05 8,15 1,25 1,15 1,15 2,35 1,60 0,35 8,10 4,75
Azerbaijan        1,50 1,55 2,10 2,80 1,80 0,25 0,85 0,25 0,05 3,30 5,44
Belarus           2,34 1,91 1,63 2,39 0,43 0,53 0,14 0,19 0,57 4,45 2,96
Bulgaria          0,84 1,68 1,68 4,94 2,24 0,19 0,56 0,75 0,47 3,26 7,74
Croatia           16,29 10,67 6,64 6,06 2,77 1,43 6,13 4,70 4,28 31,66 14,97
Czech Republic            4,72 11,20 3,42 3,32 2,54 1,49 3,60 1,14 7,90 17,06 9,46
Estonia           2,35 5,78 5,19 1,18 0,59 0,39 1,27 0,59 1,37 8,72 3,04
Georgia           2,20 3,28 5,56 1,47 2,59 0,58 1,54 1,31 0,58 6,80 5,60
Hungary           9,40 8,31 2,15 8,00 2,62 0,62 6,00 2,46 5,54 20,17 16,62
Latvia          3,50 5,08 5,00 1,92 0,75 0,83 3,25 0,67 1,58 9,25 5,92
Lithuania         3,47 2,78 2,98 1,09 1,09 0,40 1,19 0,60 0,43 6,85 3,38
Macedonia         4,42 6,03 4,62 4,92 5,73 2,31 4,32 3,22 2,81 13,67 14,97
Moldova           12,50 4,17 4,78 5,89 0,91 1,32 1,73 1,52 0,00 18,19 8,54
Poland            2,08 0,52
Romania           14,85 4,28 4,20 10,41 5,08 2,26 3,71 2,02 0,24 21,15 19,21
Russia            1,86 3,33 3,28 7,21 0,78 0,44 0,88 0,54 0,54 5,74 8,87
Serbia + Montenegro 2,31 5,59 1,97 1,97 3,29 0,46 2,96 1,84 1,25 9,74 8,23
Slovakia          9,43 7,25 2,02 2,41 2,20 1,10 3,21 1,47 6,42 18,15 7,83
Slovenia          7,27 10,26 4,49 4,59 1,30 0,80 4,88 2,89 6,29 20,42 10,77
Ukraine           2,03 1,67 1,74 3,13 0,64 0,57 0,85 0,46 0,18 4,16 4,62
OECD 17,13 24,32 14,06 8,10 5,24 3,54 9,28 9,45 9,30 43,52 20,99
China         10,07 5,73 5,87 6,40 2,40 2,27 2,87 12,67 12,93 14,53
Turkey            1,23 4,10 3,25 2,56 4,74 1,33 5,38 2,40 2,19 7,73 12,68
T-test: TEs vs. OECD 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,06 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01
Correlation with cumulative 
growth 89–98*** 0,35 0,64 -0,17 0,12 0,16 0,22 0,57 0,30 0,75 0,51 0,42
N
otes:
**** Type I  is the sum
 of paricipants in C
hurch, sport clubs and charity organisations.
**** Type II is the sum
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Table 5. Trust in formal institutions, 1995
Confidence in institution
Church  Army  Legal   Press     TV   Unions  Police Govern- Parties Parlia-  Civil    Com- Ecology Women Euro-       RoL*   
System                                              ment               ment Service  panies   mov.     mov.   pean
Union   
Transition economies 2,68 2,68 2,35 2,28 2,41 2,09 2,32 2,32 1,91 2,17 2,30 2,29 2,49 2,32 2,54 2,45
Albania           2,61 2,68 2,65 1,99 2,17 1,82 2,94 2,39 2,05 2,61 1,99 2,04 1,58 2,10 3,34 2,75
Armenia           2,84 2,93 2,08 2,16 2,33 1,82 2,07 2,25 1,75 1,95 2,17 2,41 2,33 1,95 2,58 2,36
Azerbaijan        2,82 2,59 2,43 2,07 2,20 2,12 2,39 3,30 2,55 2,92 2,33 2,25 1,72 1,75 1,91 2,47
Belarus           3,00 2,95 2,45 2,31 2,42 2,33 2,21 2,49 1,77 2,05 2,48 2,75 3,00 2,84 2,77 2,54
Bulgaria          2,60 3,15 2,23 2,37 2,79 2,13 2,47 2,62 2,07 2,35 2,42 2,15 2,32 2,35 2,88 2,61
Croatia           2,66 3,02 2,54 2,08 2,07 2,05 2,69 2,53 2,05 2,37 2,32 2,13 2,55 2,07 2,18 2,75
Czech             2,11 2,33 2,09 2,34 2,45 2,27 2,36 2,11 1,87 1,91 2,24 2,24 2,54 2,26 2,39 2,26
Estonia           2,61 2,39 2,62 2,52 2,74 2,30 2,42 2,43 1,93 2,32 2,61 2,60 2,94 2,71 2,67 2,47
Georgia           3,00 2,43 2,29 2,51 2,53 1,91 2,07 2,33 2,02 2,15 2,41 2,36 2,22 2,16 2,53 2,26
Hungary           2,35 2,62 2,51 2,11 2,33 1,93 2,55 2,33 1,89 2,25 2,51 2,18 2,32 2,09 2,73 2,56
Latvia          2,70 2,07 2,23 2,43 2,55 2,16 2,11 2,20 1,68 1,99 2,35 2,36 2,65 2,44 2,55 2,14
Lithuania         2,82 2,36 2,10 2,73 2,80 2,20 2,01 2,31 2,01 2,17 2,36 2,26 2,59 2,38 2,50 2,16
Macedonia         2,20 2,39 2,08 2,00 2,07 1,79 2,08 1,83 1,72 1,76 1,91 2,06 2,31 2,08 2,34 2,19
Moldova           3,05 2,60 2,45 2,22 2,40 2,15 2,11 2,29 1,83 2,23 2,51 2,41 2,47 2,38 2,85 2,39
Poland            2,90 3,00 2,54 2,45 2,46 2,06 2,53 2,30 1,79 2,21 2,24 2,51 2,97 2,53 2,64 2,69
Romania           3,21 3,15 2,44 2,24 2,48 2,15 2,28 1,96 1,76 1,92 2,11 2,22 2,46 2,32 2,46 2,62
Russia            2,79 2,89 2,29 2,30 2,41 2,28 2,09 1,95 1,86 1,92 2,41 1,85 2,96 2,81 2,45 2,42
Serbia + Montenegro 2,22 2,75 2,45 2,04 2,07 2,02 2,39 2,24 1,84 2,16 2,21 2,20 2,47 2,15 1,91 2,53
Slovakia          2,67 2,75 2,32 2,37 2,48 2,21 2,29 2,31 2,00 2,10 2,29 2,17 2,49 2,41 2,54 2,45
Slovenia          2,27 2,41 2,27 2,39 2,56 2,05 2,46 2,34 1,80 2,05 2,17 2,33 2,62 2,40 2,37 2,38
Ukraine           2,85 2,79 2,34 2,33 2,41 2,20 2,17 2,29 1,85 2,18 2,32 2,53 2,70 2,64 2,64 2,43
OECD 2,44 2,69 2,60 2,23 2,35 2,33 2,87 2,26 2,04 2,29 2,38 2,47 2,60 2,40 2,24 2,72
Turkey            2,67 3,59 2,86 2,46 2,44 2,47 2,84 2,30 1,93 2,35 2,69 2,62 3,18 2,99 2,43 3,10
T–test: TEs vs. OECD ** 0,05 0,47 0,01 0,27 0,23 0,00 0,00 0,27 0,02 0,09 0,07 0,01 0,14 0,18 0,00 0,00
Correlation with NDB (1996) 0,88 0,79 0,30 0,22 –0,05 –0,02 0,63 0,04 0,42 0,15 –0,47 –0,77
Correlation with BEEPS (1999) 0,30 0,37 0,50 0,73 0,71
Correlation with BEEPS RoL*** 0,27 0,12 0,57 0,44
Correlation with cumulative




Table 6. Trust in formal institutions and civic participation
Simple correlations                                    Civic Participation
Type I             Type II
Confidence in*
legal system 0,21 0,30
police 0,37 0,57
army 0,06 0,22
political parties –0,19 –0,09
church –0,22 –0,22
WBES Confidence in legal system** 0,30 0,16
NDB average trust*** 0,84 0,74
Notes:
Type I is the sum of participation in churches, sports clubs and charities.
Type II is the sum of participation in political parties, unions and professional associations
*** Source: World Values Survey 1995.
*** Source: Busines Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 1999.
*** Source: New Democracies Barometer, 1996; average of trust in legal system, police, army, 
political parties, church.
















Table 7. Initial conditions, social capital and growth (simple correlations) 
Initial Conditions Type I              Type II             WBES        WBES legal       Confidence        Cumulative
Groups             Groups          investment         system              in RoL               growth
Initial Conditions                                                                                               climate                                   (WVS)           1989–1998
GINI coefficient for income p.c. 1987–1990 0,17 0,04 –0,27 0,11 0,34 –0,35
GINI coefficient for income p.c. mid 1990s –0,42 –0,37 –0,27 –0,26 –0,22 –0,60
Ethnic heterogeneity index mid-1990s –0,18 –0,49 –0,13 –0,35 –0,57 –0,50
Religion* 0,43 –0,11 0,71 0,43 –0,15 0,59
Distance to Brussels –0,56 –0,33 –0,23 –0,03 –0,16 –0,70
Exports to CMEA/GDP 1990 –0,66 –0,83 0,05 –0,24 –0,34 –0,37
Natural resource endowment* –0,35 –0,09 –0,31 –0,10 0,08 –0,25
GDP per capita at PPP 1990 0,30 –0,15 0,57 0,13 –0,32 0,47
Urbanisation rate 1990 –0,42 –0,60 0,38 –0,13 –0,40 –0,06
Years under central planning –0,63 –0,56 –0,21 –0,38 –0,23 –0,62
Established sovereign nation* 0,34 0,82 –0,03 0,27 0,60 0,51
Notes:
Correlations printed in bold are significant at the 5% level.
Type I is the sum of participation in churches, sports clubs and charities.
Type II is the sum of participation in political parties, unions and professional associations
* Defined as dummy variables: religion = dominant religion is western Christianity; natural resources: 2 = rich, 1 = moderate, 0 = poor
Established nation state: 2 = historical sovereign nation, 1 = autonomous part of historical nation (e.g. Czech lands, Russia), 0 = new nation
state
Sources:
Data for initial conditions come from de Melo et al. (1997) for ‘exports to the CMEA’, ‘natural resource endowment’, the ‘urbanisation rate’,
‘years under central planning’ and ‘established sovereign nation’. 
Data for the GINI coefficients are from Atkinson and Micklewrigth (1992) for 1987–1990 and from UNICEF (1999) for mid-1990s.
Ethnic heterogeneity index and the dummy for religious affiliation were calculated based on data from the Europa World Yearbook (1999).
















8 Table 8. Social capital, reforms and performance: regression results; dependent variable: cumulative growth 1989–1998
1   2   3   4   5   6   7
Constant –1,53*** –1,91*** –0,85    –2,62*** –1,93*** –2,15***  –1,53***  
(0,41) (0,30) (0,98) (0,47) (0,48) (0,42) (0,41)
Type I groups (Civic) 0,021***   –0,026   0,007 0,02**  
(0,007) (0,576) (0,007) (0,007)
0,040*** 0,11*** 0,029**
Type II groups (Civic) (0,011) (0,03) (0,011)
Quality of investment 0,57* 0,75*** 0,095     1,25*** 0,31 0,50  0,57* 
climate (Trust) (0,27) (0,18) (0,662) (0,34) (0,34)     (0,29) (0,27)
0,032
Type I*Trust  (0,038)
–0,05*
Type II*Trust (0,02)
EBRD reform index 0,46 0,35  
(average 1989–1998)     (0,27)     (0,25)
0,46
EBRD reform index (residual)  (0,27)
Adjusted R-squared 0,42 0,56 0,45 0,60 0,52 0,63 0,52
Number of observations 19x 19x 19x 19x 19x 19x 19x
Sargan test for valid             0,08 0,06 0,09 0,17 0,004 0,23 0,23
instruments (X-square)          (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00)
Hausmann test 1,56        0,00     1,04  0,01   0,76  0,15  0,76 
OLS vs. IV (F-stat) (0,23) (0,95) (0,32) (0,92) (0,40) (0,71) (0,39)
Notes:
The regressions use simple OLS. All results were checked using Two Stage Least Squares and Exports to the CMEA and the Urbanisation Rate as instruments.
The coefficient estimates for civic participation tend to increase in the TSLS estimations but all other results remain unaffected.
* = 10% significance, ** = 5% significance, *** = 1% significance
In column 7, the residual of a regression of EBRD reform index against Type II group participation is used as a measure of reform to get rid of multicollinearity.
The Sargan test rejects the null hypothesis that the instruments do not belong into the regression on their own right for X-square values higher than a critical level.
The Hausman test accepts the null hypothesis that IV is prefered over OLS for F-values above a critical level.
Source: Own estimates.
Figure 1. Changes in civic participation, 1990–1995
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Type I (large) is the sum of participation in churches, sports clubs, arts clubs, environmental 
associations and charities. Type I (small) excludes arts clubs and environmental associations.
Type II is the sum of participation in political parties, unions and professional associations
Source: World Values Survey 1990 and 1995.
Notes:
The figure represents a correlation of trust in public institutions against growth
pooled over the four years: 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1998. Each dot represents one country
in one of these four years.
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Notes: 
Confidence in the legal system is measured on an index of 1 (low) to 5 (high). It provides
the mean response to the question whether respondents trusted the legal system to enforce
their contract or property rights.
Sources: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey for Confidence in Legal
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